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Indonesia's Political Prisoners
THERE A R E  A PPR O X IM A T E L Y  100,000 political prisoners in 
Indonesia today. For those who believe (as at least one Victorian 
academic does) that this total is insignificant when com pared to 
the total Indonesian population, the proportional equivalent in 
A ustralia would be approximately 10,000. M any of the prisoners 
have already been held for several years without trial, and new 
arrests are being made daily.
So far as the military authorities are concerned communism is 
a troublesome spectre. In the m onths following the “abortive coup” 
of October, 1965, they slaughtered, or presided over the slaughter, 
of between 300,000 and 1.5 million “communists” in an attem pt 
to eradicate it.1 While in m ost places the killing spree seems finally 
to have run its course, there are still occasional reports of mas­
sacres. For example, early last year H. J. C. Princen, Deputy 
H ead of the H um an Rights Institute, claimed that since November, 
1968, about 1,000 people had been massacred in the Purwodadi 
region of Central Java by two Army divisions. The government 
denied the allegations but refused to implement Princen’s suggestion 
that an independent tribunal be appointed to investigate his claim s.2
1 T h ere  is still no conclusive evidence as to the  exact num ber killed. T he 
num bers given in the  text are the lowest and highest estim ates I have heard. 
rhe Econom ist, Aug. 20, 1966, pp. 727-8, reported  that, according to a team  of 
150 university graduates from Indonesia, the  num ber killed was likely to have 
been abou t one m illion.
2 See M. Bondan (ed.), Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Service (here­
after called IC A TS), D jakarta, M arch, 1969, pp. 140-150, in which reports are 
quoted  from Pedoman, Angkatan Bersendjata, Harian Kami, Indonesia Raya, 
Sinar Harapan. Nusantara, Kompas and o th er newspapers.
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The arm ed forces newspaper claimed that the allegations were 
nothing more than fabrications by an international political guer­
rilla movement, to which most of the notable W estern social 
scientists concerned with Indonesia were alleged to belong (e.g. 
one of them, Dr. Benedict Anderson, “is a blood brother of Perry 
A nderson, editor of the New Left Review”).:i Generally, however, 
the mass slaughter seems to have been replaced by a means of 
suppression more in keeping with the rest of the 20 th century: 
political detention camps.
Indonesian statistics are not noted for reliability, and the political 
sensitivity of this issue makes a clear picture even harder to obtain. 
Nevertheless, the evidence given, even by the governm ent’s own 
spokesmen, is considerable. For example, in M arch, 1969, M ajor- 
General H. A chm at Tahir, Special D eputy of the Indonesian 
D epartm ent of Defence and Security, stated that there were then 
about 80,000 political detainees in Indonesia.4 The H ead of Public 
Relations of the Prosecutor-G eneral’s office, M. Simatupang, stated 
in February, 1969, that the total num ber of political prisoners was 
about 100,0 0 0 .5 In  October last year General Panggabean, then 
Deputy Com m ander of the Command to Restore Security and Order, 
stated that the num ber of those whose cases had not yet been 
settled —  i.e., who had not been brought to trial —  was 71,905 
persons.® Finally, in April last year, an intelligence officer of the 
D epartm ent of Defence and Security said that there were more 
than 150,000 political prisoners in Java alone.7
Details on the location and num ber of detention camps are, as 
one might expect, not so readily available. In the populous area 
of Central Java, where a “ state of war” was officially in force until 
January this year,8 the M inister for Inform ation, Budiardjo, has 
admitted that there are 16 internm ent camps w ith about 400 
persons in each.9 In  an interview last year the Chief-of-Staff of the 
Sumatra Co-ordinating Command, M ajor-G eneral M uskita, was 
asked the num ber of political detainees in Sumatra; he refused 
to give a figure, but when the num ber “2 0 ,000” was mentioned he 
replied: “There are that m any” .10 (It is not uncommon, incidentally.
a Angkatan Bersendjata, 17/3/60, p. 1. (/C A TS, M arch 1960, p. 150.)
4 IC A TS, M arch 1969, p. 134.
B N w antara , 21/2/69, p . 1. (ICA TS, Feb. 1969, p. 82.)
6 Suluh M arhaen, 31/10/69, p. 1. (IC ATS, Oct. 1969, p. 636.)
7 Review  of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, Jan .-June 1969, Sydney University, 
p. 100. T h e  statem ent originally appeared in the Djakarta Tim es, 19/4/69.
8 IC A TS, Jan . 1970, p . 1.
® Review o f Indonesian and Malayan Affairs, op. cit., p. 102.
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lor regional statistics to contradict those given by the central 
government.)
Classification of prisoners
Political detainees are divided into three categories. Those who 
are officially alleged to have had some knowledge of the “abortive 
coup” plans are classified as G roup A. W hen T ahir gave the total 
num ber of detainees as 80,000 he stated that 4.452 of them  were 
G roup A .11 The government has stated that it intends to bring 
all G roup A  prisoners to trial.
A nother 14,458 prisoners (again, using T ahir’s breakdown) are 
classified as G roup B :1- that is, the government admits that it has 
no direct evidence that they were involved in the coup attempt, so 
it intends to imprison them indefinitely without trial.
Early last year the government began looking for a suitable 
island on which it could confine G roup B prisoners, and after a 
few m onths the island of Buru, in the M oluccas, was chosen.13 In 
August last year 2,500 prisoners were taken there, among them 
one of Indonesia’s foremost writers —  Pram udya A nanta Tur. 
In the first quarter of 1970 it was planned to send a further 5,000 
prisoners there, as well as an unspecified num ber of detainees from 
Gerwani —  the form er Communist W om en’s Organization.14
Although Buru was originally given the euphemistic label of 
“ resettlem ent project”, and the prisoners theoretically allotted land 
of their own, in practice they are still detained under constant 
guard in barbed-wire-protected com pounds, and while conditions 
probably are a little better than in the camps in Java, even the 
influential daily Harian Kami stated that it was pointless pretending 
that the Buru camps were anything other than concentration camps. 
(Harian Kami went on to add that the government had no alternative 
but to  send detainees there, since it could no longer afford the cost 
of keeping them in Java, nor could it run the risk of releasing 
them .)15
A  further 24,059 prisoners are classified at G roup C: they are 
not accused of complicity in the coup attem pt, but simply of having 
been associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). 
Official government policy is to release all G roup C prisoners, and
™ Angkatan Bersendjata, 7/11/69. p. 1. (1CA T S ,  Nov. 1969, p. 705.)
11 1C A T S ,  March 1969. p. 134.
12 Ibid., p. 134.
Kompas, 13/2/69, p. I. ([C A TS, Feb. 1969, p . 82.)
14 Berita Yuriha, 16/1/70, p. 2. (1CA T S , Jan . 1970, p. 57.)
IB H arian K am i, 23/12/69, p. I. (IC A T S , Dec. 1969, p. 772-3.)
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some have already been set free. Their freedom, however, is far 
from unconditional. Every released G roup C prisoner is given a 
guide book containing an oath of loyalty which he must take 
with him wherever he goes. He is not allowed to change his 
address for at least six months, and he must report regularly to the 
authorities.1" Any infringement of these conditions results in his 
being imprisoned again —  as a G roup A or B prisoner. A recent 
visitor to  one village in Java reports that form er G roup C prisoners, 
of whom there are many in the village, are chronically unemployed 
because anybody who gives them work —  or any sort of assistance 
—  is automatically regarded as politically suspect by the all-powerful 
local army commander.
Finally, of the 80,000 detainees mentioned by T ahir, the biggest 
group, comprising about 33,000 persons, had not yet been classi­
fied17: that is, they had not even been formally accused, let alone 
tried. (O ther accounts show this group as containing even more 
detainees.)
Conditions & effects
Since most Indonesians are desperately poor, it would be ludicrous 
to expect to find good conditions in the country’s prisons. Y et the 
evidence available suggests that conditions in the political prisons 
are unnecessarily barbaric. One account states that the amount 
allocated for feeding political detainees works out at 7.7 rupiahs 
per detainee per day —  enough for one cupful of rice.1* Allegations 
of torture have also been made: for example, H. J. C. Princen 
claimed last year that the army leaders behind the mass-murders 
in Purwodadi used torture by electricity to obtain confessions.19
But it is not only the detainees themselves who are suffering. 
Thousands of families —  many of them poor to start with —  have 
been deprived of breadwinners. H undreds of women have 
been forced into prostitution; in one town in Eastern  Indonesia, 
according to  an inform ant from that town, army officers are 
systematically forcing wives of detainees into prostitution under 
threat of further harm  to the detainees themselves. Often the wives 
of prisoners never learn why their husbands have been arrested, 
under what classification they have been grouped, or even where 
they are being detained. M oreover, in many cases the relatives of 
detainees are autom atically regarded as being politically suspect.
16 Suluh M arhaen, 16/1/70, p. 2. (IC A T S , Jan . 1970, p. 5.r>.) 
i t  IC A TS, M arch 1969, p. 134.
iS B a ib ro  Karabu»la, L etter from Indonesia, Eastern H orizon, 7(5). 1969, p. 43.
1 HPedoman, 1/3/69. p. 2. (IC ATS, March 1969, p. 140-1.)
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There arc other, bizarre m anifestations of the processes at work. 
A n owner of a D jarkarta art-curio shop specialising in Balinese 
carvings almost went out of business because most of the artists 
who supplied him were either killed or imprisoned. The shortage 
of teachers in Java has become more acute as a result of the 
disproportionate num ber of teachers detained there. M any masters 
of Java’s oldest and most famout a rt form, the puppet theatre or 
"wajang” , have been imprisoned, and those still performing are 
carefully censored. Use of the PKI “complicity sm ear” has become 
notorious. Once somebody is accused of being a communist he has 
no recourse to anything, —  unless he happens to be friendly with 
a higher officer. There have been numerous cases of people 
successfully avoiding having to repay their debts by accusing their 
creditors of being “P K I”.
It is impossible at this stage to predict the political consequences 
of the present policy of political suppression. In any case, this 
issue cannot be separated from others which affect the mass of 
people, such as the bloodbath following the “abortive coup” and 
the pro-W estern economic policy of the Soeharto government. 
One thing appears to be certain, since it is noted as often by 
supporters as by critics of the government: there is today wide­
spread dissatisfaction in many rural areas —  dissatisfaction arising 
out of the suffering and social dislocation which followed the fall of 
Soekarno, with an apparent decline in educational opportunities, 
with (in some parts of Java) economic schemes that benefit mainly 
rich overseas corporations, and with the failure of the Soeharto 
government to even begin putting an end to the corruption which 
attained such spectacular proportions under Soekarno. But the 
dissatisfaction is inchoate; it is shared by politically powerless, 
leaderless, dispersed and relatively uneducated people, who are 
likely to  rem ain that way for some time to  come, since the govern­
ment response to  any clear expression of dissatisfaction would 
almost certainly be an intensification of suppression.
I believe only one prediction is in order: however successful the 
present economists and technocrats may be in curbing inflation and 
restoring “order” to the economy, and however firmly the army’s 
firepower may enable it to  rule (so long as it remains united), 
the suffering generated by the killings and the detention policy —  
and this is not being quietly forgotten —  together with the continuing 
hardship of life in the villages at a time when more and more 
people throughout the Third W orld are refusing to accept their 
poverty as just, suggest that the seeds today are being sown for 
massive future conflict. To try and predict the form and conse­
quences of this conflict would, in my opinion, be foolhardy.
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